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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to measure the failure risk of Turkish commercial banks. 
We use 29 financial ratios across 1996-2000 and apply principal component analysis to 
determine significant changes in the financial conditions of banks. We then employ these 
financial conditions, captured in factor scores, in the logit analysis to build an early warning 
model. Finally, we predict the probabilities of failure for 25 commercial banks from 2002-to 
date. The results overall indicate that almost all 25 banks currently operating in the Turkish 
banking sector are quite sound and far from failure. 
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1. Introduction 
Bank failures bring to bear high costs on economies as well as on governments and 
eventually on the public and the taxpayers. During the past two decades, many developed and 
developing economies have experienced large scale bank failures, and estimates for average 
bank restructuring costs range from 6% to 10% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Hutchison and McDill, 1999). In Turkey the amount of restructuring is approximately 30% 
of the GDP (Kılıç, 2003). Obviously, if bank failure were a predictable event, bank 
restructuring costs could be minimized. Additionally, if early warning systems are used 
effectively, the regulatory actions necessary to prevent banks from failing could be taken in 
advance or in the least a more orderly process of bank closures could be administered. 
Early bank failure studies employed multivariate statistical analyses, including 
regression analysis. For example, Meyer and Pifer (1970), and Rose and Kolari (1985) used 
discriminant models; Sinkey (1975) used logit models; Cole and Gunther (1998), and 
Pantolone and Platt (1987) used probit models. 
In terms of American industrial firms, Zavgren (1985) applied Shannon’s (1949) 
entropy measure and found that the information content of the logit model is significant even 
five years prior to failure, and increases up to one year immediately prior to failure. Keasey 
and McGuinness (1990) tested to determine if the entropy measure of the information 
contained in logit functions as developed by Zavgren (1985) offered comparable results when 
used for UK industrial firms. In that study, they concluded that the measurement was not 
applicable to UK industrial firms. 
Some studies combine nonparametric approaches with parametric multivariate 
statistical methods including discriminant or logit analysis for bank failure prediction. For 
example, Tam and Kiang (1992) introduce the neural network approach to perform 
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discriminant analysis as a promising method of evaluating banking conditions. Jo and Han 
(1996) suggest an integrated model approach for bankruptcy prediction using discriminant 
analysis and two artificial intelligence models, namely, neural network and case-based 
forecasting. They conclude that integrated models have higher prediction accuracy than 
individual models. Alam, Booth and Thordarson (2000) state that a fuzzy clustering 
algorithm and self-organizing neural networks provide valuable information to identify 
potentially failing banks. Kolari et al. (2002) use both parametric logit analysis and the 
nonparametric trait approach to develop computer-based early warning systems to identify 
large bank failures.  They conclude that the system provides valuable information about the 
future viability of large banks. Lam and Moy (2002) combine several discriminant methods 
and perform simulation analysis to enhance the accuracy of results for classification problems 
in discriminant analysis. 
Kılıç (2003), and Canbaş, Çabuk and Kılıç (2005) combined Principal Component 
analysis (PCA) with discriminant, logit and probit models to develop an Integrated Early 
Warning System for predicting bank failures in the Turkish banking sector one year prior to 
the failure. More recently, Shin and Kılıç (2006) used a PCA-based neural network 
committee model for early warning of bank failure. Additionally, Shin, Lee, and Kılıç (2006) 
used ensemble prediction of bank failure through diversification of input features. 
  In the current study, as a follow-up to the study by Canbaş, Çabuk and Kılıç (2005), 
an expanded data set of commercial banks are pooled and the principal component analysis 
and the logit analysis are combined to estimate the probabilities of banks to fail. In particular, 
we attempt to build a model to predict bank failures one year in advance of the failure. In 
particular, representing the banks by a dummy dependent variable, bty , we assign the value 
of 1 in year t-1 and t for the banks that have failed in year t.  We then exclude those banks 
from the analysis after the year failure has been announced. Next, using the PCA, the ratios 
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of banks are grouped under financial factors, which can significantly explain the changes in 
financial conditions of banks before failure. Factor scores are estimated for each bank, and 
these scores are then used as independent variables in estimating the logit model and failure 
probabilities.  
Bank failures can be considered as a continuous process in time, although failure is 
recorded at a specific point in time. We maintain that failure is mainly due to continuously 
worsening financial conditions attributable to a bank’s misguided internal management 
policies over a number of years. Financial ratios provide valuable quantitative information 
about changes in financial conditions of banks. Decision makers should examine banks over 
time to capture information about the progress towards failure. 
The major contribution of this study to the literature is the use of information 
provided by the financial factors in estimating a model. As explained in more detail in section 
2.2, the use of uncorrelated financial factors provides more refined and enhanced information 
to the decision makers than the direct use of financial ratios. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 reports the methodology and 
results, including the sample and variable selection; the determination of significant financial 
factors; and the estimation and interpretation of the results from the logit model. Then, 
Section 3 concludes the article. Finally Section 4 provides a brief summary of the early 
warning system developed in this paper. 
2. Data Methodology and Results 
2.1. Data, sample and variable selection 
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The sample set covers all commercial banks in the Turkish banking sector for the 
period of 1996-2009 (Tables 6 and 9)
 1
, including 22 banks that failed between 1997 and 
2003. In 1999 and 2000 the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) published 49 financial ratios 
annually for each bank operating in the Turkish banking sector. Data started in 1988 and 
included ratios for banks whose failures had been announced and whose operations had been 
transferred to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF).
 2, 3
 While the data started in 1988, 
many of the ratios for a number of banks were missing for the initial years and became more 
regular after 1996, although a few banks still were missing a few ratios.
4
 
Starting with 2002 the BAT began to publish 66 annual ratios for each bank.
 5
 The 
ratios published before and after 2001 are inconsistent in term of the banks operating in the 
industry and the ratios published for each bank. However, 29 ratios are compatible in the data 
published prior to 2001 and after 2001 (Table 1).  Thus, our data set includes 29 common 
annual ratios covering the period 1996 to 2009, with the exception of 2001.
6
 All the branch 
and activity ratios in current TL are converted to 2005 TL using the revaluation index 
according to the tax procedure laws.
7
 None of these ratios turns out to be significant in the 
ANOVA, except net income per branch (R26). Using the CPI and the PPI from the OECD 
database for Turkey produces similar conversion rates for these ratios.  
                                                 
1
 The number of banks in the sector changes from year to year because of mergers, buyouts and failures. The 
maximum number included in the analysis is 46 for 1997. As of 2011 25 commercial banks operate in the 
Turkish banking sector.  
2
 The SDIF was managed by the Turkish Central Bank during the 1983-2000 period, but was transferred to the Banking 
Regulation and Supervising Agency (BRSA) on August 31, 2000.  
3
 In Turkey, the BRSA is a legal entity with administrative and financial autonomy which is responsible for ensuring 
application of the Banks Act No 4389 issued July 1999. It is charged with laying down rules governing incorporation, 
management, operations, acquisition, merger, liquidation and supervision of banks in order to protect the rights and interests 
of depositors, and ensuring an efficient functioning of the credit system by giving due consideration to the confidence and 
stability of financial markets and the requirements of economic development. 
4 Missing ratios for the year 1996 and after are calculated by the authors using the averages of nearby years and sector and 
group shares.  
5 The former 49 and  the 66 ratios in effect can be found at the BAT web address:  
http://www.tbb.org.tr/eng/Banka_ve_Sektor_Bilgileri/Istatistiki_Raporlar.aspx       
6 Ratios were not published by BAT for 2001. 2001 was the year of financial and economic crises in Turkey. Starting on 
February 21, 2001, the Turkish lira lost it value sharply, interest rates sky-rocketed, and inflation began to soar. The Turkish 
GDP was reduced significantly in the same year. After the 2001 crisis, as part of a larger economic reform package the 
banking sector was reorganized. Of the 22 failed banks included in our data set, 14 failed during the period between October 
2000 and July 2003 (Table 6).   
7
 The revaluation index used can be found at the web address:  http://www.ivdb.gov.tr/pratik/oranlar/kirk.htm  
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Table 1: Ratios 
Code Ratio Categories and Names  Code Ratio Categories and Names 
 Assets Quality, %  Share in Group, % 
R1 Total Loans/Total Assets R17 Total Assets 
R2 Non Performing Loans/Total Loans R18 Total Loans 
R3 Permanent Assets/Total Assets R19 Total Deposits 
 Liquidity, %  Branch Ratios, Million TRY 
R4 Liquid Assets/Total Assets R20 Total Assets / No. of Branches 
R5 Liquid Assets/(Deposits + Non-deposit 
Funds) 
R21 Total Deposits / No. of Branches 
R6 Fx Liquid Assets/Fx Liabilities R22 TL Deposits / No. of Branches 
 Profitability, % R23 Fx Deposits / No. of Branches 
R7 Net Income(Loss)/Average T.Assets R24 No. of Personnel / No. of Branches  
R8 Net Income(Loss)/Shareholder's Equity R25 Total Loans / No. of Branches 
R9 Income Before Tax / Average Total 
Assets 
R26 Net Income / No. of Branches 
 Income-Expenditure Structure, %   Activity Ratios 
R10 Interest Income/Total Expense R27 (Salary and Emp'ee Bene.+Res. for  
Retire.)/No.of Pers.(Billion TL) 
R11 Interest Income/Interest Expenses R28 Reserve for Seniority Pay/No.of Personnel 
(Billion TL) 
R12 Non-Interest Income/Non-Interest 
Expenses 
R29 (Salaries and Emp'ee Benefits+Reserve 
for Retirement)/T.Assets 
R13 Total Income/Total Expenditure   
 Share in Sector, %   
R14 Total Assets   
R15 Total Loans   
R16 Total Deposits   
 TL: Turkish Lira, FX: Foreign Exchange  
 
    We partitioned the data set into two sub-samples; one is the model sample covering 
the period 1996-2000, and the other is the test (holdout) sample covering the period of 2002-
2009. We use the model sample to estimate the model. Then, using the estimated model we 
predict the failure risk of the banks for the holdout sample.  
Using the uni-variate analysis of variance (ANOVA), we determine the most relevant 
financial ratios for bank failures. The null hypothesis in ANOVA is the equality of the means 
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of the failed and non-failed banks for a given ratio. Table 2 presents the results of the 
ANOVA tests, including the F statistics and the corresponding significance levels for the 
selected ratios for each year. The table reveals that a total of 18 out of 29 ratios emerge as 
statistically significant. We select the ratios that are significant at the 5% level. These are the 
relevant financial ratios that have a high discriminating ability for the two groups, failed 
versus non-failed banks. 
Table 2: Tests of Equality of Group Means 
  Non-failed Failed Total  Test of group means’ equality 
 Code Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Wilks' 
Lambda F(1,215) Sig. 
R1 34.1036 14.6621 30.3384 13.8037 33.5657 14.5716 0.9918 1.7805 0.1835 
R2 5.7667 23.1804 160.2178 364.2305 27.8311 147.7170 0.8655 33.4078 0.0000** 
R3 8.8675 9.3281 16.4104 13.2735 9.9451 10.2954 0.9340 15.2003 0.0001** 
R4 44.5053 17.9357 33.7179 16.5820 42.9643 18.1115 0.9564 9.8110 0.0020** 
R5 56.8031 28.9613 32.6135 17.9779 53.3474 28.9007 0.9138 20.2758 0.0000** 
R6 45.4642 21.3907 25.9413 16.4373 42.6753 21.8244 0.9016 23.4751 0.0000** 
R7 3.4737 4.1249 -31.8493 44.9519 -1.5724 21.1828 0.6579 111.7805 0.0000** 
R8 40.3776 135.7328 -464.7252 2512.2586 -31.7799 961.1210 0.9660 7.5616 0.0065** 
R9 4.7863 5.1964 -31.5578 45.1532 -0.4058 21.6515 0.6534 114.0583 0.0000** 
R10 100.6046 21.2771 60.4223 265.4029 94.8643 101.8308 0.9808 4.1986 0.0417* 
R11 239.4059 345.0996 116.3624 62.6488 221.8283 323.1240 0.9822 3.9048 0.0494* 
R12 -0.3365 123.0795 -47.3023 114.7195 -7.0459 122.7749 0.9820 3.9412 0.0484* 
R13 131.9842 37.1055 68.0839 53.0882 122.8556 45.5298 0.7577 68.7581 0.0000** 
R14 2.2697 3.3797 0.9579 0.7894 2.0823 3.1751 0.9790 4.6115 0.0329* 
R15 2.2337 3.3960 0.8852 0.8878 2.0410 3.1954 0.9781 4.8152 0.0293* 
R16 2.3573 3.8761 1.3202 0.9174 2.2092 3.6217 0.9899 2.1909 0.1403 
R17 6.5566 10.2492 11.3657 16.4547 7.2436 11.4202 0.9782 4.7948 0.0296* 
R18 6.8147 11.4505 16.0254 29.7893 8.1306 15.6838 0.9576 9.5259 0.0023** 
R19 6.8158 11.5265 10.6503 13.4050 7.3636 11.8557 0.9871 2.8028 0.0956 
R20 110.8392 257.9485 50.4794 38.1760 102.2164 240.0805 0.9922 1.6849 0.1957 
R21 62.8361 169.3690 47.1761 35.9900 60.5990 157.4134 0.9988 0.2621 0.6092 
R22 20.6444 56.9123 23.8176 25.7226 21.0977 53.5470 0.9996 0.0929 0.7608 
R23 42.1918 117.3095 23.3586 14.6471 39.5013 108.9032 0.9963 0.7939 0.3739 
R24 36.1951 98.7178 22.4984 7.6157 34.2384 91.5299 0.9972 0.5939 0.4418 
R25 35.8399 91.8582 12.9239 8.8547 32.5662 85.4542 0.9912 1.9190 0.1674 
R26 4.2098 14.8976 -15.9328 23.0329 1.3323 17.7110 0.8409 40.6825 0.0000** 
R27 53.1214 25.9585 56.7137 12.9024 53.6346 24.5325 0.9974 0.5686 0.4516 
R28 1.3451 1.8359 1.3076 1.4451 1.3397 1.7824 0.9999 0.0117 0.9140 
R29 2.5742 2.0631 3.4525 2.3327 2.6997 2.1204 0.9789 4.6354 0.0324* 
* and ** represent %5 and %1 significance level, respectively 
 
2.2. Principal components analysis and determination of the significant financial 
factors   
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The use of PCA and financial factors in estimating a model provides more refined and 
enhanced information to decision makers compared to the direct use of financial ratios for 
several reasons. Firstly, PCA allows conversion of a large number of closely related financial 
ratios into a small number of financial factors and thus helping researchers understand 
underlying relationships better. Secondly, financial factors permit to explain the percentage 
of change in the total variance of the financial condition of banks over time. 
Furthermore, using financial ratios directly in estimating logistic or other similar 
models would be problematic because most of the financial ratios are correlated with each 
other. This leads to a multicollinearity problem among independent variables (ratios). For 
example, Kılıç (2003) showed that most of the financial ratios in the Turkish banking system 
are highly correlated. This is an important consideration because a high degree of 
multicollinearity produces large variation in the estimated coefficients of the ratios. 
Particularly, the coefficients can change substantially depending on which variables are in or 
out of the model and also the order in which they are placed in the model. In summary, PCA 
converts a set of closely related (correlated) financial ratios into uncorrelated financial 
factors. The lack of giving adequate consideration to these issues is an important shortcoming 
of traditional bankruptcy studies conducted previously.   
Applying PCA, we estimate 6 financial factors that could significantly explain the 
changes in the financial condition of the banks for the period considered (1996-2000). We 
estimate the total variance explained by each factor (eigenvalues) in order to determine how 
many factors are needed to represent the selected financial ratios. Table 3 presents the 
estimated factors and corresponding eigenvalues of the estimated factors. Only those factors 
that have variances greater than 1 (eigenvalue >1) are selected. Factors with a variance less 
than 1 are not any better than a single ratio since each standardized ratio has a variance of 1.  
Table 3: Total variance explained by the selected factors 
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 Variance Explained 
Component Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % 
F1 4.55 25.27 25.27 
F2 3.53 19.62 44.89 
F3 1.78 9.90 54.79 
F4 1.37 7.59 62.39 
F5 1.16 6.46 68.85 
F6 1.02 5.69 74.54 
 
For the period 1996-2000, F1 is the most important factor in explaining changes in the 
financial conditions of the banks. It explains 25.27 % of the total variance of the statistically 
significant financial ratios, whereas factor F2 explains 19.62 % of the total variance. The 6 
common factors together explain 74.54 % of the total changes in the financial conditions of 
the commercial banks for the period considered. 
After the determination of the significant factors, we calculate the regression factor 
scores estimated for each bank and each year. We, then, use these factor scores as 
independent variables in estimating the logit model and the probabilities of failure. 
2.3. Estimation of the logit model  
The basic assumption in the estimation of the logit model is that banks can be split 
into two groups, namely, the non-failed group and the failed group. Thus, banks can be 
represented by a dummy dependent variable bty . This variable takes the value of 1 in year t-
1 and t if the bank b has failed in year t and 0 otherwise. The logit analysis is based on a 
cumulative logistic distribution function providing the probability of a bank belonging to one 
of the prescribed classes given the financial characteristics of the bank.  
As mentioned earlier, the factor regression scores obtained from the PCA serve as 
independent variables in estimating the logit model. We employ the backward Wald method 
in estimating the logit model. This is a stepwise method which eliminates variables from the 
model based on the probabilities of the Wald statistic, providing the most parsimonious 
model. Hence, among the 6 factors that were previously determined, and the constant, α, the 
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backward Wald stepwise method selects only factors F1, F3, F4 and F5 as independent 
variables. 
 
 
          Table 4: Estimated logit model 
Factors ˆ  Exp ( ˆ ) S.E. Wald P-Value 
F1 -3.915 0.020 0.900 18.937 0.000 
F3 -1.498 0.224 0.458 10.701 0.001 
F4 -1.632 0.195 0.697 5.486 0.019 
F5 -0.561 0.571 0.264 4.514 0.034 
Constant -2.630 0.072 0.405 42.160 0.000 
Model summary 
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
89.276 0.336 0.600 
 
Table 4 presents the test statistics for the estimated coefficients of the logit model. 
Here, all of the coefficients of the estimated logit model are now statistically significant. 
Thus, the cumulative logistic distribution function used in calculating the failure probabilities 
for each bank, b, in year t is given by 
 
)5561.04632.13498.11915.363.2(
1
1
)1(
btbtbtbt FFFFbt e
yp


 
The lower panel of Table 4 presents the overall test statistics for the estimated logit 
model. The likelihood ratio test is statistically significant at the 1% level; Cox & Snell R 
Square is 33.6 %; and Nagelkerke R Square is 60 %. Given the limitations in data, such as 
starting with a limited number of ratios and not being able to include 2001 in the analysis 
when 9 of the failures were announced, we interpret these results as the model having a 
reasonably high explanatory power.  
The performance of the estimated logit model can also be evaluated according to the 
classification achievements. Considering the cutoff point as 0.500, our null hypothesis is that 
a bank will fail, and the alternative hypothesis is that it will not fail. The summary of the 
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classification results are presented in Table 5. Here, overall classification accuracy is very 
high (92.63%). Type I error (the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is 
correct) is 41.94 % (13/31). We must note that the failures of 7 of these banks are correctly 
predicted by the model for the year of failure but not one year prior to the failure.
8
 For 4 of 
these banks the year of failure is not included in the analysis as they failed in 2001, the year 
for which data were not available.
9
 Type II error (the probability of accepting the null 
hypothesis when it is not correct) is 1.64 % (3/186), noting that two of these banks eventually 
failed (Bank Express and Milli Aydın Bankası). Here, a type I error means that an actually 
failed bank is classified as non-failed, while a type II error means that an actually non-failed 
bank is classified as failed by the estimated model. A type I error is more important than a 
type II error because, as stated previously, the international average for bank failure costs was 
estimated to be 6 to 10% of GDP, prior to the recent global turmoil in the financial markets. 
If a bank failure is predicted in advance, the cost of the failure can at least be minimized, 
even if it cannot be completely eliminated.  
 
Table 5: Classification results for the model sample (1996-2000) 
Actual 
Observed 
Predicted  
Non- Failure (0) Failure (1) Percentage Correct 
Non-Failure (0) 183 3 98.36 
Failure (1) 13 18 58.06 
Overall Percentage   92.63 
The cut value is 0.500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 These banks are Bank Ekspres, Bank Kapital, Egebank, Eskişehir Bank, Etibank, Sümerbank and Türk Ticaret Bank. 
9
 These are Bayındırbank, Kentbank, Toprakbank and  Türkiye Emlak Bank. 
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Table 6: Estimated failure probabilities for 1996-2000 
BANKS Failure 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
Adabank A.Ş.                                - 0.0139 0.0207 0.0277 0.0096 0.0026 0.0149 
Akbank T.A.Ş.                               - 0.0020 0.0037 0.0019 0.0026 0.0077 0.0036 
Alternatif Bank A.Ş.                        - 0.0076 0.0830 0.0550 0.0038 0.1075 0.0514 
Anadolubank A.Ş.                            - N. A. 0.0000 0.0011 0.0516 0.0577 0.0276 
Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş.                      - 0.0077 0.0253 0.0092 0.0022 0.0068 0.0102 
Denizbank A.Ş.                              - N. A. 0.0042 0.0270 0.0521 0.1223 0.0514 
Fiba Bank A.Ş.                              - 0.0094 0.5370* 0.1065 0.0113 0.0951 0.1519 
Finans Bank A.Ş.                            - 0.0076 0.0111 0.0083 0.0079 0.0212 0.0112 
HSBC Bank A.Ş.                              - 0.0164 0.0362 0.2146 0.0000 0.0094 0.0553 
Koçbank A.Ş.                                - 0.0020 0.0311 0.0188 0.0055 0.1081 0.0331 
MNG Bank A.Ş.                               - 0.0001 0.0001 0.0011 0.0218 0.1427 0.0332 
Osmanlı Bankası A.Ş.                        - 0.0170 0.0555 0.0437 0.0206 0.0589 0.0391 
Oyak Bank A.Ş.                              - 0.0001 0.0034 0.0016 0.0129 0.2885 0.0613 
Şekerbank T.A.Ş.                            - 0.0684 0.1217 0.0637 0.0461 0.0730 0.0746 
Tekstil Bankası A.Ş.                        - 0.0241 0.0333 0.0113 0.0256 0.0508 0.0290 
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş.               - 0.0113 0.0684 0.0043 0.0088 0.0047 0.0195 
Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş.                   - 0.0228 0.0473 0.0131 0.0125 0.0232 0.0238 
Turkish Bank A.Ş.                           - 0.0346 0.0218 0.0134 0.0188 0.0058 0.0189 
T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş.         - 0.0352 0.0661 0.1034 0.1116 0.1038 0.0840 
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş.                - 0.0181 0.0158 0.0105 0.0214 0.0273 0.0186 
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş.                   - 0.0387 0.0515 0.1019 0.0751 0.1382 0.0811 
Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş.                     - 0.0067 0.0076 0.0100 0.0043 0.0157 0.0089 
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O.             - 0.0287 0.0123 0.0193 0.0233 0.0932 0.0354 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş.                  - 0.0366 0.0231 0.0459 0.0109 0.0108 0.0255 
Bank Ekspres A.Ş.                         Dec. 1998 0.0918 0.0676* 1.0000  -  - 0.3865 
Bank Kapital Türk A.Ş.                    Oct.  2000 0.0102 0.0502 0.0907 0.2753* 1.0000 0.2853 
Bayındırbank A.Ş.                         July 2001 0.0665 0.7535* 0.0281 0.0297 0.0294* 0.1814 
Demirbank T.A.Ş.                          Dec. 2000 0.0330 0.0431 0.0148 0.0108* 0.224* 0.0651 
Ege Giyim Sanayicileri Bankası A.Ş.       July 2001 0.0329 0.1244 0.1572 0.1820 0.5422 0.2077 
Egebank A.Ş.                              Dec. 1999 0.0913 0.0814 0.2875* 1.0000  - 0.3651 
Eskişehir Bankası T.A.Ş.                  Dec. 1999 0.0977 0.1330 0.4907* 0.9999  - 0.4303 
Etibank A.Ş.                              Oct.  2000 0.0063 0.4424 0.0726 0.1113* 0.9987 0.3263 
İktisat Bankası T.A.Ş.                    March 2001 0.0091 0.0322 0.0912 0.0770 1.0000 0.2419 
Interbank                                 Jan.  1999 0.3233 0.4088 0.9997 0.9812  - 0.6783 
Kentbank A.Ş.                             July   2001 0.0904 0.0838 0.1030 0.0748 0.0828* 0.0870 
Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş.                July   2001 0.1057 0.1261 0.3109 0.6475* 0.8214 0.4023 
Pamukbank T.A.Ş.                          June 2002 0.2059 0.1411 0.1233 0.0908 0.0570 0.1236 
Sitebank A.Ş.                             July 2001 0.0000 0.0003 0.1293 0.1526 0.6678 0.1900 
Sümerbank A.Ş.                            Dec. 1999 0.0317 0.0386 0.3304* 0.9984  - 0.3498 
Toprakbank A.Ş.                           Nov.  2001 0.0203 0.0270 0.0174 0.0266 0.0933* 0.0369 
Türk Ticaret Bankası A.Ş.                 Nov.  1997 0.1480* 0.8357  -  -  - 0.4919 
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş.                July 2001 0.0720 0.1370 0.1513 0.0369 0.1372* 0.1069 
Türkiye İmar Bankası T.A.Ş.               July  2003 0.0478 0.0318 0.0742 0.2539 0.1150 0.1045 
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T.T.Bankası Yaşarbank A.Ş. Dec. 1999 0.1488 0.2406 0.8262 1.0000  - 0.5539 
Ulusal Bank T.A.Ş.                         Feb. 2001 0.0257 0.0002 0.0003 0.0019 0.9217 0.1900 
Yurt Ticaret ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş.        Dec. 1999 0.1577 0.1583 0.5497 1.0000  - 0.4664 
Average  0.0506 0.1139 0.1310 0.1934 0.2175 0.1413 
Average (Non-Fail)  0.0186 0.0533 0.0381 0.0233 0.0656 0.0398 
Average (Fail)  0.0826 0.1799 0.2785 0.3975 0.3620 0.2601 
N.A.: Not available, * Represents misclassifications by the estimated logit model 
Table 6 shows the probability of failures obtained from the logit model for the model 
sample which covers the period of 1996-2000. The last row and the last column show the 
average probabilities of failure.  We can explain the underlying relationships among financial 
ratios and factors by observing factor loadings. Varimax (orthogonal) factor rotation in the 
PCA is used for this purpose. This method maximizes the variance of loadings within factors 
and produces a structure that is easier to interpret. Table 7 presents the factor loadings 
obtained from the orthogonally rotated factor solution. Ratios with factor loadings less than 
0.5 are omitted. 
According to Table 7 the significant loadings for Factor 1 (F1) are R7, R9, R2, R26, 
and R13 in a descending order reflecting mostly profitability and income-related ratios and 
affecting F1 positively with the exception of R2. Hence, as the first component, F1, which 
contributes the most in explaining the changes in the financial conditions of the banks during 
the period, can be considered as the income-profitability factor.   
The significant loadings for Factor 3 (F3) are R4, R6 and R5, all liquidity ratios, all 
affecting F3 positively and all reflecting a bank’s readiness to absorb TL and FC liquidity 
risk. Thus, F3 can be thought of as the liquidity factor (TL and FC). Ratios that are significant 
for Factor 4 are R11 and R13, both reflecting the income-expenditure structure of the banks 
and both affecting F4 positively. Finally, F5 is affected by R12 and R10, both again reflecting 
the income-expenditure structure. R12’s impact is positive while R10 impacts F5 negatively 
and indicates the interest rate risk.  
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Table 7: Orthogonally rotated factor solutions 
  
F1 F3 F4 F5 
R7  (Net Profit (Losses) / Total Assets) 0.937       
R9 (Income Before Taxes / Total Assets) 0.934       
R2  ( Loans under follow-up (net) / Total Loans) -0.748       
R26  (Net Income / No. of Branches) 0.713       
R4 (Liquid Assets / Total Assets)   0.846     
R6 (FC Liquid Assets / FC Liabilities)   0.842     
R5 (Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-Deposit Funds))   0.839     
R11 (Interest Income / Interest Expense)     0.91   
R13 (Total Income / Total Expense) 0.632   0.667   
R12 (Non-Interest Income / Non-Interest Expense)       0.773 
R10 (Interest Income / Total Expenses)       -0.609 
 
Turning to the model’s out-of-sample predictive ability for the commercial banks 
currently operating in the banking industry, tables 8 and 9 provide a summary of 
classification results, and the probability of failures for the holdout sample 2002-2009, 
respectively. The last row and last column of table 9 give the average failure probabilities.  
Here, the overall classification accuracy is extremely high (99.00%). Only in two cases, 
where the income-profitability ratios of the relevant banks are somewhat problematic, does 
the model predict failure of actually non-failed banks. In other words, the probability of 
accepting the null hypothesis when it is not correct (Type II error) is only 1.00 % (2/200).  
 
        Table 8: Classification results for the holdout sample (2002- 2009) 
 
Actual  
Observed 
 
Predicted 
 
 
Non- Failure (0) Failure (1) Percentage Correct 
Non-Failure (0) 198 2 99.00 
Failure (1) - - - 
Overall Percentage   99.00 
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The cut value is 0.500 
 
 
 
Table 9: Predicted failure probabilities for 2002-2009 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
T. C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. 0.0365 0.0097 0.0060 0.0052 0.0040 0.0040 0.0217 0.0082 0.0119 
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş.                 0.0738 0.0449 0.0723 0.0564 0.0270 0.0227 0.0626 0.0315 0.0489 
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O.           0.0225 0.0098 0.0055 0.0076 0.0108 0.0161 0.0415 0.0153 0.0161 
Adabank A.Ş.                              0.0801 0.0632 0.6937* 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1048 
Akbank T.A.Ş.                             0.0021 0.0009 0.0015 0.0027 0.0050 0.0063 0.0295 0.0083 0.0070 
Alternatif Bank A.Ş.                      0.4168 0.1231 0.0891 0.0826 0.0589 0.0564 0.0543 0.0844 0.1207 
Anadolubank A.Ş.                          0.1683 0.0665 0.0397 0.0773 0.0753 0.0685 0.0723 0.0484 0.0770 
Şekerbank T.A.Ş.                          0.1705 0.0865 0.0239 0.0173 0.0151 0.0425 0.1067 0.0673 0.0662 
Tekstil Bankası A.Ş.                      0.0850 0.0501 0.0702 0.0995 0.0645 0.1270 0.1458 0.1092 0.0939 
Turkish Bank A.Ş.                         0.0044 0.0043 0.0077 0.0131 0.0097 0.0197 0.0083 0.0162 0.0104 
Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş.                 0.0162 0.0215 0.0283 0.0446 0.0550 0.0676 0.0661 0.0594 0.0448 
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş.              0.0654 0.0310 0.0184 0.0127 0.0177 0.0082 0.0231 0.0047 0.0227 
Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş.                   0.0152 0.0059 0.0030 0.0018 0.0037 0.0035 0.0079 0.0037 0.0056 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş.                0.0083 0.0399 0.0408 0.5207* 0.0728 0.0913 0.0572 0.0253 0.1070 
Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş.                    0.0057 0.0091 0.0324 0.0382 0.0365 0.0662 0.1024 0.0069 0.0372 
Citibank A.Ş.                             0.0033 0.0145 0.0162 0.0027 0.0067 0.0099 0.0388 0.0224 0.0143 
Denizbank A.Ş.                            0.0187 0.0105 0.0186 0.0177 0.0235 0.0901 0.0840 0.0243 0.0359 
Deutsche Bank A.Ş.                        0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0027 0.0019 0.0000 0.0006 
Eurobank Tekfen A.Ş.                      0.0421 0.0479 0.0640 0.1025 0.0502 0.0912 0.1028 0.0593 0.0700 
Finans Bank A.Ş.                          0.0420 0.0409 0.0338 0.0252 0.0094 0.0484 0.0916 0.0289 0.0400 
Fortis Bank A.Ş.                          0.0127 0.0195 0.0303 0.0626 0.0619 0.0683 0.0785 0.0881 0.0527 
HSBC Bank A.Ş.                            0.0099 0.0105 0.0255 0.0215 0.0482 0.0419 0.0470 0.0249 0.0287 
ING Bank A.Ş.                             0.0910 0.1358 0.0706 0.0491 0.0739 0.1306 0.1127 0.1055 0.0962 
Millennium Bank A.Ş.                      0.0284 0.2800 0.3685 0.1883 0.3547 0.2332 0.2367 0.3451 0.2544 
Turkland Bank A.Ş.                        0.0151 0.0197 0.0192 0.0768 0.1562 0.2279 0.1680 0.0977 0.0976 
Average 0.0574 0.0458 0.0712 0.0611 0.0496 0.0618 0.0705 0.0514 0.0586 
* Represents misclassifications by the estimated logit model  
 
 
Figure1: Average probability of failures by years     
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Figure 1 above, based on the last rows of Tables 6 and 9, and illustrates the average 
probability of failures predicted by the logit model for all the commercial banks in Turkey 
since 1996. The economic and financial measures that were undertaken after the 2001 crisis, 
which in part were designed to better scrutinize the financial system and specifically banks, 
seem to be working.  Despite the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in Turkey, in 
terms of growth, unemployment, inflation, difficulties in the export markets, a global 
financial crisis shaking the world, and a relatively unstable political environment in recent 
years, the Turkish commercial banks appear to be quite far from the risk of failure.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Results of this study show that if decision makers monitor banks over time, they can 
capture a significant amount of information about the changes in the financial conditions of 
banks. Using uncorrelated financial factors provides more refined and enhanced information 
to decision makers than using financial ratios directly.  As such, they can become part of the 
early warning toolkit available to internal management and outside bank supervising 
agencies.  
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Economic conditions also appear to affect the probability of bank failures. Banking 
crises happen when the macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when growth is 
low and inflation is high. In addition, high real interest rates are in general associated with 
systemic problems of the banking sector (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). The moral 
hazard problem (financial liberalization combined with explicit deposit insurance and weak 
law enforcement) also increases the failure probabilities (Hutchison and McDill, 1999). 
All of the above macroeconomic problems were observed in Turkey during the period 
of 1992-2009, contributing to the failure of 26 banks between 1994 and 2003. There is no 
doubt that the adverse macroeconomic conditions contributed to bank failures in Turkey. 
However, no banks have failed in Turkey since 2003, despite the global financial crises and 
the failures experienced by some of the prominent players in the global financial system. It 
could be argued that the adverse macroeconomic conditions and the unfavorable global 
financial environment have increased the probability of bank failures. Nevertheless, the non-
failed banks in Turkey have survived in contrast to the group that failed under the same 
adverse macroeconomic conditions and financial environment. Hence, despite the adverse 
effects of worsening macroeconomic conditions on bank failures, this study underlines two 
important factors unequivocally contributing to bank failures: 1) internal conditions resulting 
from a bank’s own mismanagement and misguided policies; and 2) the failure of monitoring 
agencies to warn and to take under close examination the banks with high potential to fail.   
A cursory examination of recent bank failures in the United States suggests that 
similar factors may have played a role in the wave of fresh bank failures there. Future 
research can determine whether these findings hold true for other countries, and if the world 
can learn from the Turkish experience. Our gut feelings are that they can.  
 
4. Early Warning System  
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 14, September 2012 
 
371 
 
In order to use the early warning system developed in this paper for bank failures in a 
future period t, we explain the process step-by-step below.  
 
4.1. Select the significant ratios for bank failures 
Select the significant original ratios for the banks via ANOVA. These are the ratios 
whose means differ significantly between failed and non-failed banks. Then, calculate the 
means and standard deviations for each of these ratios. The means and standard deviations of 
the significant ratios calculated for the model sample of 1996-2000 are given in Table 10.    
 
Table 10: Mean and the standard deviation of the original ratios  
Code Name of ratios Mean  ( ir ) Std. Deviation ( ir ) 
R2 Loans under follow-up (net) / Total Loans 27.8311 147.7170 
R3 Permanent Assets / Total Assets 9.9451 10.2954 
R4 Liquid Assets / Total Assets 42.9643 18.1115 
R5 Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-Deposit Funds) 53.3474 28.9007 
R6 FC Liquid Assets / FC Liabilities 42.6753 21.8244 
R7 Net Profit (Losses) / Total Assets -1.5724 21.1828 
R8 Net Profit (Losses) / Total Shareholders' Equity -31.7799 961.1210 
R9 Income Before Taxes / Total Assets -0.4058 21.6515 
R10 Interest Income / Total Expenses 94.8643 101.8308 
R11 Interest Income / Interest Expenses 221.8283 323.1240 
R12 Non-Interest Income / Non-Interest Expenses -7.0459 122.7749 
R13 Total Income / Total Expense 122.8556 45.5298 
R14 Total Assets   (Share in Sector, %) 2.0823 3.1751 
R15 Total Loans   (Share in Sector, %) 2.0410 3.1954 
R17 Total Assets  (Share in Group, %) 7.2436 11.4202 
R18 Total Loans   (Share in Group, %) 8.1306 15.6838 
R26 Net Income / No. of Branches 1.3323 17.7110 
R29 (Personnel Expenses + Reserve for Employee 
Termination Benefit) / Total Assets 
2.6997 2.1204 
 
4.2. Compute the standardized values of the ratios selected  
Compute the standardized values of the ratios selected in section 4.1 by using the 
original values and the mean and standard deviation of each ratio given in table 10.  
i
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Here inz is the standard value of ratio i for observation n (bank b in period t). ir and 
is  are the mean and standard deviation of ratio i for all the banks and years in the model 
sample given in table 10. Hence, the original ratios are standardized so that the mean and the 
standard deviation of the standardized ratios are zero and one, respectively. Thus, the matrix 
of standardized ratios is  

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MNN
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. 
Here N is the number of observations (number of banks in each year added for the 
period of interest, 200 for our test sample). Each observation can be used for risk evaluation 
of a particular bank in a particular future period, t. Note that the matrix NxmZ starts with the 
first observation of ratio two, 2r  since the first ratio, 1r , turns out to be insignificant in the 
ANOVA test along with 16r , 2519 rr  and 2827 rr  . Thus, the index M refers to the last 
significant ratio, 29r , while index m indicates the number of significant ratios in the ANOVA 
test (m =18) in Table 11.  
 
4.3. Compute the factor scores matrix 
Multiply the standardized ratios matrix ( NxmZ ) obtained in step 2 by the component 
score coefficients matrix ( mxkL ) given in Table 11, to obtain the factor scores matrix, 
( NxkF ). Each row of NxkF shows the significant factor scores used in the LOGIT analysis for 
a particular bank b in period t.  
Table 11: Component score coefficient matrix ( mxkL ) 
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F1 F3 F4 F5 
Z2 -0.244 0.033 0.152 -0.008 
Z3 -0.023 -0.183 0.241 0.220 
Z4 -0.067 0.349 -0.042 -0.092 
Z5 -0.021 0.33 0.036 0.006 
Z6 -0.030 0.387 -0.068 0.156 
Z7 0.274 -0.039 -0.025 0.007 
Z8 -0.078 -0.020 0.085 0.118 
Z9 0.268 -0.034 -0.004 0.010 
Z10 0.093 0.034 -0.065 -0.488 
Z11 -0.105 -0.043 0.699 -0.041 
Z12 0.078 0.072 -0.094 0.584 
Z13 0.103 -0.066 0.438 0.055 
Z14 0.006 0.038 -0.014 0.134 
Z15 0.015 0.013 -0.002 0.140 
Z17 -0.063 0.069 0.059 -0.128 
Z18 -0.055 0.056 0.063 -0.214 
Z26 0.211 -0.020 -0.066 0.005 
Z29 -0.128 0.187 0.043 0.018 
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Here N is the number of banks that are selected for evaluation in some future period t, 
and k is the number of significant factors (k=4) given in Table 11.  
 
4. 4. Calculate the failure probabilities 
Finally, calculate the failure probabilities for each bank, b, in year t using the factor 
scores ( NxkF ) obtained in section 4.3 as independent variables in the logit model.   
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To summarize, we provide the steps of the early warning system in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Select bank b in year t 
Pick up the significant ratios (Tables 2 and 11)  
Standardize the ratios 
        
i
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_

  
Calculate the regression factor scores by using the factor 
score coefficients matrix (L) from Table 11 
xkmmxNkxN LZF   
Bank likely 
will fail 
Figure 2: Flow diagram of early warning system  
P bit > 0.5? 
 
Calculate the probability of failure for bank b in year t 
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